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Political liberalism and the value of autonomy 
Kirsten Meyer 
In a recent article in Analysis, Ben Colburn (2010) argues against the alleged necessity to take 
sides in a controversy in political philosophy. This controversy can be summarized in the 
following form:  
(1) The state ought to promote autonomy.  
(2) The state ought not in its action to promote any value.  
(3) Autonomy is a value. 
With (3) in (1), we see that (1) and (2) are incompatible. Some autonomy-minded 
perfectionists endorse the first claim and deny the second.1 In contrast, political liberals 
endorse the second claim and deny that the state ought to promote autonomy.2 Colburn wants 
to endorse both claims. This, however, is to have one’s cake and eat it, too.  
In order to be able to endorse both claims, Colburn modifies two of the above statements:  
(2a): The state ought not in its action to promote any first-order value. 
(3a): Autonomy is a second-order value.  
According to Colburn, with these modifications at hand, there is no conflict between the claim 
that the state ought not to promote any values and the idea that it ought to encourage 
autonomy. However, in the following, I will argue that Colburn’s modifications fail to 
dissolve this tension between political liberalism and an autonomy-minded perfectionism. 
 
1. A critique of 3a 
First of all, let us focus on Colburn’s notion of autonomy and his modified claim (3a). 
Colburn holds that there are two different notions of autonomy in the literature, one taking 
autonomy as a first-order and the other taking it as a second-order value. The former outlines 
autonomy as an ideal of a particular way of life, such as the Socratic ideal of a thoroughly 
self-reflective life. In contrast, second-order conceptions of autonomy do not specify any 
particular way of life for an individual to lead in order to be autonomous. Rather, they suggest 
that autonomy “is a value which consists in an agent deciding for herself what is a valuable 
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life, and living her life in accordance with that decision.” (Colburn 2010: 247-48). This 
definition of autonomy includes a reference to the autonomous person’s values and hence an 
ineliminable second-order variable making autonomy a second-order value. Colburn 
concludes that autonomy in this sense is compatible with an anti-perfectionism that prohibits 
the state to promote first-order values.  
The problem of this approach is its dependence on an irritating dichotomy between first- and 
second-order values. Admittedly, second-order conceptions of autonomy do not specify any 
particular way of life of the following sort: They are not claiming that in order to lead a 
valuable life, one must value playing the piano and therefore do so three times a day. 
However, perfectionist conceptions of value leave this room for personal decisions, too. For 
example, some perfectionists endorse Aristotelian ideas, such as developing one’s essential 
human capacities. Even in these conceptions there is a lot of room for personal evaluations. It 
is not at all fixed which capacities we should develop and how exactly we should do that. 
Therefore, we cannot sharply distinguish between those conceptions that specify any 
particular way of life and those that do not – instead, it is a matter of degree. It is just that 
those who think that autonomy is the core value seem to leave more room for personal 
evaluations than some other accounts.3  
However, even though second-order autonomy accounts leave more room for individual 
choices, they nevertheless restrict the range of options for a good life. There is no categorical 
difference between those conceptions of the good that refer to second-order values (such as 
autonomy) and those that refer to first-order values. In order to see this, we should focus on a 
concrete question which reveals the differences between those philosophers who think that the 
state ought to promote autonomy and those who think that it should refrain from it: should 
state education promote the autonomy of children against their parent’s will?  
Some parents intend to withdraw their children from public schools, because school 
education, through a confrontation with other values, is said to threaten their children’s (non-
reflected) commitment to religious values.4 Should the state insist on a compulsory education 
and thereby try to make these children more autonomous? Those who subscribe to a political 
                                                 
3 Hurka is an example of someone who leaves comparably less room for individual evaluations. For example, 
within his perfectionist account, Hurka argues that even if one had forced Mozart to dedicate his life to music, 
his life would have been better than an autonomously chosen life of sun tanning. This is because Hurka thinks 
that “even if autonomy has some value, it cannot have so much as to outweigh all Mozart’s music.” (Hurka 
1993: 149). 
4
 In political philosophy, the most prominent and widely discussed example deals with the aims of the Amish 
and the according decision of the Supreme Court, who found that Amish children could not be placed under 
compulsory education past 8th grade. See, for example, Galston (1995) and Macedo (1995). 
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liberalism (the “anti-perfectionists”) deny this, since they insist that autonomy is just one 
value among concurrent others, such as religious values.5 In contrast, those who think that the 
state should promote autonomy, insist that in order to live a good life, one must lead an 
autonomous life. According to them, the ability of living one’s own life instead of simply 
taking over one’s parent’s values should be promoted via state education.6 Raz states that 
“individuals should develop freely to find for themselves the form of the good which they 
wish to pursue in their life” (1986: 133). This, however, presupposes the ability to critically 
reflect about certain values, such as one’s parent’s values. The children might in the end still 
be committed to certain religious conceptions of the good, but they should have the 
opportunity to depart from them. 
This debate shows that there is no sharp distinction between the so-called first- and second- 
order concepts of autonomy. Colburn claims that first-order conceptions of autonomy take 
autonomy to be an ideal of a particular way of life, such as the Socratic ideal of a thoroughly 
self-reflective life. However, so-called second-order conceptions also take autonomy to be an 
ideal of a particular way of life. The difference may just be the amount of reflection that is 
demanded in order to call someone autonomous (normally not as much as Socrates does and 
thus not a thoroughly self-reflective life).  
2. A critique of 2a 
It is time to bring Colburn’s second modification into play. So far, I raised some doubts 
concerning the plausibility of the distinction between first- and second-order values. Let us, 
for the sake of the argument, accept this distinction. Still, Colburn’s position depends upon 
the plausibility of (2a), that is the idea that the state ought not to promote any first-order 
values. However, this does not seem to be a claim that an anti-perfectionist would subscribe 
to. Anti-perfectionists think that it is too limited, since it allows for the promotion of some 
forms of autonomy (in Colburn’s words: the promotion of second-order autonomy). This, 
however, is something political liberals explicitly deny. According to them, the state should 
not aim at promoting any form of autonomy of its citizens or justify a compulsory education 
with the value of autonomy.7  
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Yet, Colburn thinks that this rests on a misunderstanding: political liberals actually reject the 
promotion of first-order conceptions of autonomy. Colburn argues that Rawls has the state-
promotion of first-order values as his target. In Political Liberalism, Rawls mentions the 
liberalisms of Kant and Mill as an example of comprehensive doctrines of value which the 
state ought not to promote. Colburn thinks that Rawls is referring to first-order conceptions of 
value here.8  
However, even if this was the correct description, it does not follow that Rawls is also 
committed to the claim that it is only first-order conceptions that the state should not promote. 
Political liberals can also insist that the state should not promote certain second-order 
conceptions. Colburn himself discusses this worry for his account: there is “a whole host of 
putative second-order values, the state promotion of which would be just as offensive to anti-
perfectionist intuitions” (2010: 253). As examples of these cases, Colburn refers to 
conceptions of the good life that imply a lack of autonomy, such as the (alleged) second-order 
value of “following one’s parent’s values” (2010: 253). He tries to solve this problem by 
saying that “if the state should promote individual autonomy, then it certainly shouldn’t be in 
the business of trying to get people to do only what their parents consider valuable” (2010: 
254). 
Colburn concludes that the autonomy-minded anti-perfectionist could be and even should be 
an anti-perfectionist about a whole range of second-order values, just not on the value of 
autonomy. Unfortunately, within this argument he presupposes what had to be shown: that the 
anti-perfectionist really is autonomy-minded in the sense that his anti-perfectionism is 
compatible with or even relies on the value of autonomy. He has by no means shown that 
political liberals do not oppose promoting second-order autonomy, or that they should be in 
favour of promoting second-order autonomy. It would have been his task to show this, since 
the contributions of political liberals to the debate on whether or not the state should promote 
autonomy via education hint at another direction. Political liberals deny that the state may aim 
at promoting any form of autonomy via education and they do not explicitly or implicitly 
restrict their position to a form of second-order autonomy. 
For example, Macedo discusses the attempt to justify a certain mandatory reading program, 
which interferes with some parent’s ability to teach their children their particular religious 
views, by referring to the ideal of “rational deliberation of ways of life.” Against this attempt, 
Macedo holds that this is an ideal these parents are fundamentally opposed to. According to 
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Macedo, instead of focusing on ideals, we should follow the approach suggested by Rawls. 
We should put aside ultimate ideals of human perfection and instead “attempt to justify at 
least the most basic matters of justice on grounds widely acceptable to reasonable people - 
and not only to those who share our particular view of the whole truth” (Macedo 2010: 477). 
Macedo argues with regard to Rawls’ political liberalism instead of endorsing the second-
order value of autonomy.  
Colburn needs to argue against these political liberals that the state may well promote second-
order autonomy. There is at least a hint to a possible argument in his paper. Colburn thinks 
that every consistent anti-perfectionist position should allow or even call for the promotion of 
autonomy. This is because “the only credible motivation for first-order Anti-Perfectionism is 
either an explicit endorsement of or tacit reliance on the Autonomy Claim” (2010: 254). 
However, if this is the crucial premise of his argument, it is rather weak. If religious parents 
argue against an enforced state-education of their children, do they thereby have to subscribe 
to the value of autonomy? Do they have to admit that a resentment of this form of state-
intervention must rest on an endorsement of the value of autonomy? Not at all. They oppose a 
state intervention if it is justified by a reference to a value (autonomy) that they do not 
endorse or which they hold to be less important than other values (e.g. religious values). 
Therefore they might claim that this state action cannot be justified towards them.  
3. Modifying 2 again 
At this stage, we should point out that this is just the quarrel about ideals that political liberals 
want to avoid. Thus, they do not refer to the value of autonomy, but to the need of a 
justification for state action to everyone it concerns. If there is a reasonable pluralism 
concerning certain values (or their relative importance within a conception of the good life) in 
a pluralist society, a promotion of these values cannot be justified towards everyone. So let us 
modify (2) in this sense: 
(2b): The state ought not in its action to promote values of which there is reasonable 
disagreement in a pluralist society. 
This formulation is much closer to the spirit of anti-perfectionism than Colburn’s proposal. 
Colburn’s proposal might be welcomed by those who think that the state should endorse 
autonomy. Nevertheless, they will still be distinguishable from the political liberals who 
subscribe to (2b) and deny (1). And the latter do not get any reason to depart from their 
position by Colburn’s reformulation of the above argument. Thus the opposition between (1) 
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and (2b) still persists and cannot be eradicated that easily. One would have to argue against 
the very possibility of a reasonable disagreement concerning the value of autonomy. This, 
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